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Introduction: My purpose here is to set forth the criteria for withholding
or withdrawing treatment. To put it another way, it is concerned with
distinguishing treatments which the Catholic tradition has called
"ordinary" or, more recently, "proportionate" (morally obligatory means
of preserving life) and treatments which the Catholic tradition has called
"extraordinary" or, more recently, "disproportionate" (morally nonobligatory means of preserving life). But before discussing these criteria, it
will first be helpful to set forth briefly some guiding principles and
presuppositions relevant to the question of caring for the sick and dying. I
will then note relevant Church teaching on the distinction between
"ordinary" and "extraordinary" means of treatment, following this with a
critique of some influential contemporary interpretations of this teaching
which I believe are very mistaken and mischievous, and finally set forth
objective criteria for distinguishing between "ordinary" and "extraordinary" means, i.e., criteria for withholding or withdrawing treatment.

I. Basic Presuppositions and Principles)
I. Human bodily life is a great good . It is a good of the person and
intrinsic to the person and is not a mere instrumental good or good for the
person.
2. It is possible to kill innocent persons by acts of omission as well as by
acts of commission. 2 Whenever the choice to withhold or withdraw a
treatment carries out a proposal , adopted by choice, to end life, the
omission of such treatment is an act of killing by omission.
4. Euthanasia, or the deliberate killing of the innocent for motives of
mercy, is not morally justified by reason of its merciful motives.
5. Like other killing of the innocent , euthanasia can be carried out by
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acts of omission ("passive euthanasia") as well as by acts of commission
("active euthanasia"). The distinction is morally irrelevant.
6. Competent persons have the moral and legal right to refuse any
"extraordinary" treatment, i.e., any treatment which is useless or
excessively burdensome; nonetheless , they must exercise great care in
reaching the judgment that a treatment is useless or excessively
burdensome. This is necessary both in order to avoid any intention to end
life on the grounds that it is devoid of intrinsic worth and in order to fulfill
properly the obligation to respect human life.
7. Likewise; those who have the moral duty to make decisions for the
noncompetent (e .g., infants or the permanently unconscious) have a moral
right to refuse any useless or excessively burdensome treatment for them .
This right, however, must be exercised with great care in order to avoid the
temptation, unfortunately not uncommon in our society, to devalue the
lives of the noncompetent or to regard such persons chiefly in terms of the
utilitarian values they represent. Too often, unfortunately, the judgment
that a treatment is useless or excessively burdensome does not reflect
serious consideration of the objectively discernible features of the
treatment, but is an expression of attitudes toward the life being treated.
8. Human life can be burdened in many ways. But no matter how
burdened it may be, human life remains inherently a good of the person. 3
Thus, remaining alive is never rightly regarded as a burden , and
deliberately killing innocent human life is never rightly regarded as a
benefit.
II. Relevant Church Teaching
Here I wish to call attention to two major documents of the Church's
Magisterium which are relevant to our consideration of the distinction
between "ordinary" and "extraordinary" means. The first is an important
statement made by Pope Pius XII in 1957 in addressing a congress of
anesthesiologists. In the course of his remarks, Pius had this to say:
But normally one is held to use only ordinary means [to prolong life] according to the circumstances of persons, places, times, and culture - that is to
say, means that do not involve any grave burden for oneself or another. A more
strict obligation would be too burdensome for most men and would render the
attainment of the higher, more important good too difficult. Life , health, all
temporal activities are in fact subordinated to spiritual ends. On the other hand,
one is not forbidden to take more than the strictly necessary steps to preserve life
and health , as long as he does not fail in so me more important duty'

This statement of Pius XII is obviously relevant to the distinction between
"ordinary" and "extraordinary" means of treatment - and to the criteria
for determining whether or not it is morally appropriate to withhold or
withdraw treatment. He indicates, in this statement, that "ordinary"
medical treatment is that kind of treatment which offers some reasonable
hope of benefitting the subject without imposing unacceptable burdens on
the subject or others, whereas "extraordinary" medical treatment is
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treatment which imposes unacceptable burdens on the subject and / or
others. The pope himself did not address the specific criteria for
distinguishing between treatments which are ordinary and those which are
extraordinary. Rather, he outlined a general approach that seems clear
enough, but one which obviously requires more specification.
A central problem in interpreting this statement by Pius XII has to do
with the proper way of understanding what he meant when he said that life,
i.e., bodily, physical life, is subordinated to "spiritual ends". I shall return
to this problem of interpretation below, in commenting on views which I
think are unacceptable.
A second major document of the Church's teaching authority relevant
to our question is the "Declaration on Euthanasia" issued by the
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith in 1980. While unequivocally
condemning as absolutely immoral, suicide and all forms of euthanasia,
this document reaffirmed traditional Catholic teaching that one is not
obliged to use all possible means to preserve and prolong human life. It
referred to the distinction between "ordinary" and "extraordinary" means
of preserving life, noting that the imprecision of these terms is the cause of
some ambiguity and that, therefore, some more recent writers had
suggested that the term "proportionate" be used to designate means which
are morally obligatory and that the term "disproportionate" be used to
designate means which are not morally obligatory. It stated that no matter
what terms are used to designate the distinction, it will nonetheless be
possible to make a correct judgment
by studying the type of treatment to be used, its degree of complexity or risk, its
cost and the possibilities of using it, and comparing these elements with the result
that can be expected , taking into account the state of the sick person and his or
her physical and moral resources .s

Moreover, the same document maintained that "one cannot impose on
anyone the obligation to have recourse to a technique which is already in
use but which carries a risk or is burdensome . Such a refusal is not the
equivalent of suicide; on the contrary, it should be considered as an
acceptance of the human condition, or a wish to avoid the application of a
medical procedure disproportionate to the results which can be expected,
or a desire not to impose excessive expense on the family or community".6
In addition, it says that "when inevitable death is imminent in spite of the
means used, it is permitted in conscience to take the decision to refuse
forms of treatment which would only secure a precarious and burdensome
prolongation of life, so long as the normal care due to a sick person in
similar cases is not interrupted" .7
The precise significance of these statements will occupy us more fully
below. For the present I can simply say that this document clearly implies
that medical treatments judged, on objective bases, to impose grave
burdens either upon the subject of the treatments or the family of the
subject, or indeed, of the human community of which the subject is a
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member, are not morally required and hence can be withheld or
withdrawn. In assessing these burdens, moreover, it is necessary to take
into account the resources, physical and moral, of the subject. It is likewise
legitimate to take into account the burdens which the treatment will
impose on others.
III. Erroneous Proposals for Interpreting "Extraordinary" Means
In this part of my talk, I wish to examine the views of two influential
Catholic authors regarding the distinction between "ordinary" and
"extraordinary" means. I regard these views as erroneous and dangerously
misleading. I will first consider the position taken by Richard A.
McCormick, S.J., currently professor of moral theology at the University
ofN otre Dame. McCormick's proposal for understanding the significance
of "extraordinary" means is an example of a "quality of life" ethic that is
not, in my judgment, acceptable.
McCormick, in an exceptionally influential article which was published
simultaneously in the Journal of the American Medical Association and
the Jesuit magazine America in 1974, and again in an article which
appeared in the prestigious Hastings Center Report in 1977 8 , insisted that
it is not possible to judge which treatments are "extraordinary" and hence
not morally obligatory, without necessarily making "value of life"
judgments. He wrote: "There has been a tendency to shift the problem
from the means to reverse the dying process to the quality of the life
susta ined or preserved .... Granted that we can easily save the life, what
kind of life are we saving?'''! (emphasis added) . According to McCormick,
bodily, physical life, while indeed "basic" and "precious"lo, is a relative
good, one "to be preserved precisely as the condition of these other values
[interpersonal relationships], It is these other values and possibilities
which found the duty to preserve physical life and also dictate the limits of
this duty"ll . In his view, the Judeo-Christian tradition holds that "the
meaning, substance, and consummation of life are to be found in human
relationships and the qualities of justice, respect, concern, compassion and
support that surround them" .12 Because this is so, one can judge that
bodily life is not a value to be preserved when the potential for these
relationships has been lost or if it can never be attained. He maintains that
"when in human judgment this potentiality [for human relationships] is
totally absent or would be, because of the condition of the individual,
totally subordinated to the mere effort for survival, that life can be said to
have achieved its potential"l3. He claims that the reason for withholding or
withdra wing a treatment is based on a judgment about the quality of life
which the treatment will preserve. Thus he says: "Often it is the kind of, the
quality of, the life thus saved (painful, poverty stricken, and deprived,
away from home and friends, oppressive) that establishes the means as
extraordinary. That type of life would be an excessive hardship for the
individual"14 (emphasis in original).
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There are very serious problems with McCormick's proposal that the
proper way to determine whether a means is "extraordinary" or not is by
focusing attention on the quality of life which is preserved by the means.
The principal problem is that there is a vast difference between concluding
that particular treatment is excessively burdensome and hence "extraordinary" and not morally obligatory and concluding that someone's We is
excessively burdensome. Pius XII and the Vatican Declaration on
Euthanasia directed our attention to the nature of the treatments used to
preserve life. McCormick redirects our attention to the quality of the life
which these treatments preserve. Moreover, if we judge that someone's life
is so burdensome that there is no longer any obligation to preserve it, are
we not in essence saying that this person's life is no longer something good,
but has now become a disvalue, a burden, and that, consequently, the
person would be better off dead than alive? This seems to be clearly implied
when McCormick asserts that "that type of life would be an excessive
hardship for the individual." The burden which needs to be lifted is not the
burden of a treatment but the burden of a life. And this is lifted only when
the person is dead. In my opinion, McCormick's proposal denigrates the
inherent value of human bodily life, regarding it as a good for the person,
not a good of the person. It is good only so long as it is serves as the
condition for what McCormick regards as truly human or personal goods,
namely, relational goods whose existence is dependent upon one's
conscious awareness of them.
Another Proposal

Another influential proposal for understanding Church teaching on the
distinction between "ordinary" and "extraordinary" means of treatment
has been advanced by Kevin O'Rourke, O.P., director of the Center for
Health Care Ethics, St. Louis University Medical Center. O'Rourke is not,
like McCormick, an advocate of a "quality of life" ethic. Nonetheless, he
offers an interpretation of Pius XII's discourse on the prolongation of
human life which is, in my judgment, seriously deficient and which
logically leads to a quality of life ethic.
O'Rourke advances his position while commenting on the passage from
Pius XII's address which we have previously examined, in particular, that
portion of his talk in which Pius said that excessively burdensome
treatments would "render the attainment of the higher, more important
good too difficult" and that "life, health, all temporal activities are in fact
subordinated to spiritual ends." According to O'Rourke, the Pope's
emphasis on the spiritual goal of human life
specifies more clearly the terms 'ordinary' and 'extraordinary'. A more adequate
and complete explanation of 'ordinary' means to prolong life would be: those
means which are obligatory because they enable a person to strive for the spiritual
purpose of life. 'Extraordinary' means would seem to be: those means which are
optional because they are ineffective or a grave burden in helping a person strive
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for the spiritual purpose of life 1s

What is the problem with O'Rourke's interpretation? I would agree, for
reasons to be set forth later, that a means is extraordinary if it imposes a
"grave burden" on a person and prevents him or her from striving for the
spiritual purpose of life. But I think that O'Rourke errs gravely when he
claims that a means is extraordinary if it is "ineffective . .. in helping a
person strive for the spiritual purpose of life" and that a means is ordinary
precisely because it enables a person to strive for the spiritual purpose of
life. Why do I think that O'Rourke errs here? Many people, including some
seriously handicapped children and some elderly people who are not "with
it" persons who are not actually able to judge the truth or falsity of
propositions or make free choices, are not capable of striving for the
"spiritual purpose" of life. They cannot do so because, in order to do so, a
person must be able to make judgments and to make free choices. But these
unfortunate human beings are still persons; their lives are still good , and it
is good for them to be alive. If they should fall sick and be in danger of
death, they surely have a right to some sort of medical treatment which
would prolong and preserve their lives. Thus , for example, if an elderly
individual suffering from seni'Iity - one whom everyone would regard as a
noncompetent person unable to care for himself or herself - should suffer
a cut artery and be in danger of dying because of loss of blood , I think it
would surely be morally obligatory to stop the bleeding by appropriate
medical treatments. Such treatments, in my judgment, would surely be
"ordinary" or morally obligatory. Yet, on O'Rourke's analysis , they would
not, for they would not be effective in helping this person to "strive for the
spiritual purpose of life." So something seems amiss with O'Rourke's
analysis .
That this is the case is confirmed , I think, by a statement made by a
priest, the Rev. Thomas F. Schindler, S.S ., director of ethics ofthe Mercy
Health Services in Farmington; Hills, MI. Schindler, who thought that
O'Rourke's analysis of the distinction between "ordinary" and "extraordinary" means was excellent, came to the conclusion that
we should no longer state the ethical obligation as one of'prolonging life.' Rather,
we should refer to the obligation of maintaining a life 'capable of reaching life's
spiritual goals' or 'capable of realizing life's purposes'. '6

I believe that Father Schindler has accurately captured the thrust of
O'Rourke's proposal. My problem is that if this is correct, then it means
that the lives of countless severely handicapped persons, including infants
and the elderly, are regarded as worthless. There are many such persons
who are no longer capable or will never be capable of "reaching life's
spiritual goals" or of "realizing life's purposes". They are not capable of
doing so because they simply cannot engage in human acts, i.e., acts
proceeding from the person with deliberation and choice. They are not
moral agents. But, I submit, they are still beings of moral worth, i.e.,
persons, whose lives are irreplaceably precious and worthy of our respect
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and love. To deny these persons treatment on the grounds that treatment
will not help them realize life's purposes is grossly unjust and unfair. It
surely cannot be what Pius XII meant. But unfortunately, this way of
understanding what Pius XII said is becoming, I fear , more and more
widespread in the Catholic community, due in part to the influence of
O'Rourke. 17
I thought it important to examine and criticize the proposals advanced
by McCormick and O'Rourke for understanding the difference between
"ordinary" and "extraordinary" means of treatment, because it is helpful
to know what this distinction does not mean . Now I intend to shed some
light on what this distinction does mean.
4. Objective Criteria for Distinguishing Between "Ordinary" and
"Extraordinary" Means

We will be helped to discover the criteria for withholding or
withdrawing treatments (=criteria for distinguishing between ordinary and
extraordinary means of treatment) by first considering non-suicidal
reasons for refusing treatment which competent persons might
legitimately have. As Germain Grisez and Joseph Boyle have noted ,
individuals who are competent can refuse treatment upon themselves without the
intent to end their own lives, which would be their motive if they appraised their
future prospects and decided that they would be better off dead . Such refusal of
treatment , including treatment without which life will be shortened , can be based
upon objectionablefeatures of the treatment itself. its side effects, and its negative
consequences. An individual who has no desire to die can take such factors into
account and decide that life without treatment, so long as life lasts , will be better
than life with it. Such a decision is not a choice of death. 18

A human person, in other words, can refuse a treatment (choose that it be
withheld or withdrawn) without adopting by choice a proposal to kill
himself or herself. The treatment refusal is based on the judgment that the
treatment itself, or side effects of the treatment, or bad consequences ofthe
treatment, are so burdensome that undergoing the treatment is not
morally obligatory. Consequently, the treatment in question is "extraordinary."
What are some nonsuicidal reasons for refusing treatment? I think that
here too the position developed by Grisez and Boyle, who seek to build on
the foundations established by Pius XII and the Vatican Declaration, is
worth noting. They propose that among nonsuicidal reasons for refusing
treatment are the following:
First, sometimes treatment is experimental or risky ... second, some treatment is
itself painful or brings about other experienced conditions which are undesirable
. . . third, in many cases, the requirements for the application of medical care
would interfere with the activities and experiences which one desires during the
time [of life] remaining . . . fourth, many people object to certain forms of care on
the basis of some principle [for example, Jehovah's Witnesses refuse blood
transfusions because they believe that this is immoral] ... fifth, there is a

August, 1990

87

variety of reasons why persons find medical care psychologically repugnant .. .
sixth, in many cases medical care for one individual makes very severe demands
upon others. '9

To put matters in another way, medical treatment is "extraordinary" or
"disproportionate" and hence not morally obligatory if objectively
discernible features in the treatment itself, its side-effects, and its negative
consequences impose grave burdens on the person being treated or on
others. Excessive burdensomeness is the major criterion, therefore, for
determining whether or not to withhold or withdraw medical treatments.
Excessive burdensomeness is, one could say, the genus. Species of
excessivl.: burdensomeness include the riskiness of the treatment, the
excessive pain of the treatment, the severely negative impact that the
treatment will have on the subject's life, treatments judged morally or
psychologically repugnant, and treatments which would be too costly and
severely imperil the economic security of the patient, the patient's family,
or the community. One could choose to forego such treatments, even
foreseeing that by doing so one's life will be shortened, without in any way
intending death.
How, then, is Pope Pius's statement that "life, health, all temporal
activities are in fact subordinated to spiritual ends," with the result that
treatments rendering "the attainment of the higher, more important good
too difficult" can be considered too burdensome? O'Rourke, as will be
recalled, claimed that ordinary means are "those means which are
obligatory because they enable a person to strive for the spiritual purpose
of life" (emphasis added), while extraordinary means are "those means
which are optional because they are ineffective or a grave burden in
helping a person strive for the spiritual purpose of life" (emphasis added) .
As I noted previously, I think that a treatment would be extraordinary and
hence not morally obligatory if the treatment itself so affected the subject
that it rendered the subject incapable of pursuing the spiritual purpose of
life. I believe that this is what Pope Pius XII meant in his statement. But if
the person is already unable to pursue this purpose by reason of some
malady which renders him or her unable to reason and make choices, the
person's handicap cannot be used to justify the withholding or withdrawal
of treatment. In other words, it is not morally right to deny treatments to
human persons because of the "poor" quality of their lives. Yet in assessing
the burdensomeness of a treatment, one can take into account the person's
condition or "quality of life" insofar as this condition is related to the
treatment. The late John R. Connery, S.l. , put the matter well when he
said that while the Catholic tradition has repudiated a quality of life ethic
which would deny persons needed medical care simply on the basis of the
quality of their lives, it nonetheless
traditionally allowed quality of life considerations in decisions about prolonging
life if Ihey were relaled 10 Ihe means Ihemselves (emphasis added). Thus, if a
particular means ... would cause a drastic alteration of one's lifestyle, it might
not be obligatory. Such a means would be classified as extraordinary because
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of the permanent handicap it would cause.'o

In addition to burdensomness, another criterion used to determine
whether a means is morally obligatory or not is that of usefulness. In the
Catholic tradition, a means has been judged useless or relatively useless if
the benefits it provides to a person are nil (useless, in a strict sense) or are
insignificant in comparison to the burdens it imposes (useless in a wider
sense). Thus, the two criteria for determining whether or not it is morally
right to withhold or withdra w treatments are those of burdensomeness and
uselessness. The former is the major criterion insofar as the relative
uselessness of many treatments is contingent upon the burdens they
impose when compared to the benefits they provide. But what is most
important is that these criteria draw attention to the means used to
preserve life. Such means can rightly be judged "disproportionate" or
"extraordinary" because of objectively discernible features in them and
their side-effects, and their negative consequences on the patient's life leads
one to the conclusion that their employment is either excessively
burdensome or useless . But they do not lead one to conclude that the life of
the patient-person is either burdensome or useless, for human life,
however heavily burdened and devoid of utilitarian values, is always a
great and precious good of irreplaceable persons.
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